Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1965

Eastern Utah Development Company v. General
Insurance Company of America, A Corporation,
and Fred Reynolds : Appellant's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.F. Robert Bayle and Wallace R. Launchnor; Attorney for
Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Eastern Utah Dev't Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America, No. 10359 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3609

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EASTERN UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, a corporation, and FRED REYNOLDS,
Defendants-A. ppellants.

Case No.
10859

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Distriet Court
of Salt Lake County
Hon. Merrill C. Faux, Judge

F. Robert Bayle and
Wallace R. Lauchnor
Of Bayle, Hurd & Lauchnor
1105 Continental Bank Buildi1141
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants

Edward M. Garrett
Of Hanson & Garrett
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

FILED
AUG 181965

•

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ST ATEl\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE____ 3
DISPOSITION IN LOYVER COURT ______________ 4
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------- 5
STATE~IENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------- 6
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL ______________ 10
ARGGMENT
I. THE COLTRT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRAXT DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY·s MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, AS
A ~IATTER OF LA
12
II. THE COURT EHRED IN FAILING
TO RCLE, AS A :MATTER OF LAW, THAT
PLAINTIFF RE:JIAINED A PARTNER
YVITH DEFENDANT :FRED REYNOLDS
FOR THE PURPOSE OF WINDING UP
PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS. ---------------------------- 15
III. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO RULE, AS A .MATTER OF LAW, THAT
PLAINTIFF 'VAS LIABLE TO THE INSURANCE COl\lPANY BY INDEMNITY
UNTIL THE COMPLETION OF PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.---------------------------------------- 17
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO SGBl\llT TO THE JURY ANY OF DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS, ON THEIR THEORY OF THE
CASE. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18
V. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO SUBl\IIT TO THE. JURY THE ISSUE
OF DAMAGES. ------------------------------------------------------ 19
VI. THE COCRT ERRED IN FAILING
TO FIND THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO
INTERROGATORIES T'VO AND THREE
OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT TO BE INCONSISTENT. -------------------------------------------------------- 20
VII. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO RULE, AS A l\IATTER OF LAW, THAT
1

,V_ ------------------------------------------

PLAINTIFF IS ONLY ENTITLED TO
ACCOUNTING F R 0 .M DEFENDA~
FRED REYNOLDS IN WINDING U~
PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS

CON CL USI ON ...........................·.. :::::::::::::::::::::::::::· ~:
CASES CITED
Bates vs. Simpso12: 1~1 Vt. 165, 239 P2d 749.... Ii ·
Cook vs. Peter K1ew1t Sons Company, 15 Ut 213d'
~o, 386 P2~ 616 ............................................:.. ~
Ferrm vs. Ferrm, 7 Vt.2nd 5, 315 P2d 978
... 13
················································
13, u 16 22

Holland vs. \Vilson, 8 Ut.2,11d 11, 327 P2d 250 ' ,
19
Lane vs. Peterson, 68 Ut. 858, 251 P. 274 ............:::: 1; ~
STATUTES CITED
Section 48-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ...... 14,U
Section 48-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .... 14, lj I
Section 48-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .... 16,17'
Section 48-1-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ........ 23 I
Section 48-1-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
··················································
13, 14, 16, 22 .
Section 48-1-28, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ........ ll !
Sect~on 48-1-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .... 14.1'. j
Section 48-1-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ........ 11 :
Section 48-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ........ 13 '
Section 48-1-33, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ........ Ii

i

TEXT CITED
23 American Jurisprudence, Fraud and Deceit,
27
30
40
40
40
53

9

,

1

A~~;~~: ~ ~r!~r:de~-~~:·"J~d~~~-i-t~~----··--·-- IT, ~

I
i
I

Section 16, Page 345 ............................................ !J
American Jurisprudence, Joint Adventures,
, '.
Section 55, Pages 980-982 ............._. .................... 1 !
American Jurisprudence, Partnerships,
!
14
Section 136, Page 224 ·····················:············--....
i
American Jurisprudence, Partnerships,
H!
Section 188, Page 259 ···················;·············
.. ····· i
American Jurisprudence, Partnerships,
I
'
273 ··-··----·-···-·····-------·-·············
.................. 13 I
S ect1on
American Jurisprudence, Trial,
20
Section 1082, Page 750 ·····································

2

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EASTERN UTAH DEVELOP:\IENT CO.MP ANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Responde1':1,
vs.

GENERAL INSURANCE COMP ANY OF AMERICA, a corporation, and FRED REYNOLDS,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
10359

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendants
alleging that defendant Fred Reynolds had incurred
a debt with the plaintiff for rental of plaintiff's equipment and that defendant General Insurance Company
of America, as bonding company on the project under
construction, was obligated to pay the plaintiff by
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virtue of its labor and material bonds. Defend t R
.
. .
an ey.
nolds clauns that plamtiff was his partner or · ··
.
.
a Jomtventurer m the proJect, and therefore is only entitled
to an accounting. Defendant General Insurance Com.
pany of America, as bonding company on said pro'ect
claims that plaintiff, as a joint-venturer or partn;r of
Reynolds, is obligated to indemnify this defendant for
any losses sustained on the project by virtue of its
bonds and that plaintiff cannot make claim under its
own bond.
The bonds were issued to Reynolds ~s principal.
The insurance company was not told that plaintiff was
Reynolds' partner when the bonds were written. The
plaintiff also claims damages from Reynolds for his
alleged negligence in the performance of the contract.

1

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT

The plaintiff brought its action against the defend·
ants for money claimed to be due and owing. Plaintiff
claimed a rental agreement with Reynolds for the use i
of its equipment. Reynolds denies the agreement. Plain· \
tiff also claims that defendant General Insurance Com·
pany of America, as bonding company on said project.
is obligated to the plaintiff by virtue of its bonds. Both
defendants claim that plaintiff is a partner of Reynolds
and as such is only entitled to an accounting from
'
'
l · der
Reynolds. In no event can plaintiff make c aim un
1

its own bond.

4

l

The plaintiff, although admitting that is was a
partner or joint-venturer with Reynolds at the commencement of the project, claimed that the partnership
was terminated and that thereafter the plaintiff rented
its equipment to Reynolds in order to complete the
partnership project and has not been paid for said
equipment. (R24-27, 36-44)
The case was tried before the Honorable Merrill
C. Faux, District Judge, and upon completion of the
plaintiff's evidence, and at the conclusion of all the
evidence, motions to dismiss were made by counsel for
the defendants. They were subsequently denied by the
Court. (R333-334, 344-345, 418-419) The case was
submitted to the jury at the close of the evidence. The
issues were submitted to the jury in the form of special
interrogatories. (R54-57) Based upon the answers
made to these interrogatories, the Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against both defendants. (R95) .Motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial were filed
by both defendants and subsequently denied by the
Court. (R93-95) Defendants thereafter filed this appeal. (R106)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Both defendants seek reversal of judgment entered
in the lower court and for an order requiring an ac5

counting between the plaintiff and defendant R

.

eyno\rJs

STATE.l\IENT OF FACTS
In order to promote clarity, the respondent will~
referred to as plaintiff, appellant :Fred Reynolds will
be referred to as Reynolds, and appellant General In.
surance Company of America will be referred to a)
the Insurance Company.

The plaintiff, upon receiving an invitation to biu
the proposed co~str~ction of the irrigation canal by the
Koosharem Irrigation Company, contacted its local 1
insurance agent in an effort to obtain a bid bond. Plain· j
tiff was told that the bonding company previously useil j
by the plaintiff was no longer doing business in the !
state; that a bond could not be obtained for the plaintiff. I
(R135) It then solicited defendant Reynolds to become .
a join-venturer to bid the job, as Reynolds was able to I
obtain a bond. (R174-176) The plaintiff was to bea I
silent partner until the job was commenced. (Rl78·
180) It was agreed that Reynolds and plaintiff woula
perform the contract as joint-venturers or partners.
in the event Reynolds was successful in his bid. (R143· !
144, 182-183)

!

Reynolds and a Yice president of the plaintiff com·
pany, Max Fausett, visited the area where tbecanalwa):
. t d th cost of the
to be constructed and together estuna e e . . hii .
project, whereupon Reynolds submitted a bid iil :
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I

I

name, as previously agreed upon between these parties.
(Rll7-118, 140-141, 144) The bid was accepted.
(RI81)
Reynolds obtained bonds from the insurance company naming Reynolds as the principal under the
bonds. The bonds were to guarantee the payment of
labor and materials in the job, as well as the faithful
performance of the contract.
An agent for the insurance company had previously
told the plaintiff that he would not accept the plaintiff
company as a client for the issuing of bonds because
of the poor financial rating of the plaintiff. (R176,
342-343)

Thereafter, plaintiff and Reynolds obtained the
necessary equipment to commence the project. Both
the plaintiff and Reynolds owned various items of equipment necessary for the project and agreed that they
would charge to this project a specified hourly rate for
the use of their equipment. Any profits derived thereafter would be divided equally. (R143-144, Exhibits
4P and 5P) Both plaintiff and Reynolds moved their
equipment and men on to the project and commenced
work. Plaintiff furnished several employees from its
company to assist Reynolds in the performance of the
contract. (Rl41, 143-145, 147)
During the early stages of the project, plaintiff's
Yice president, Fausett, made numerous trips to the
project in an effort to assist Reynolds in any difficulties
7

that he was encountering. (Rl54-155) Plainfff
I ahr:
·
.
k ept m touch with the progress of the proJ·ect thr ,
.
~
its employees and by conversations had with Reynolds
by telephone. (R157, 363)

After considerable work had been done on the
project, it was discovered by plaintiff and Reynold~
that a large portion of the ground wherein the canal
was to be cut, was considerably more rocky than had
been anticipated, and the expense of clearing the roe~
from the path of the cutting machine was taking more
time and creating more expense than was anticipated.
This work was necessary, however, to maintain a straight
cut and keep the floor of the canal level. (Rl58, 160)
It was necessary to haul fill dirt from another area to
fill the canal that was being cut. Various other prob!elll.I
were encountered as the work progressed, and it soon
created conflict between Reynolds and the plaintiff as
to the method of doing the work. The job was moving
much more slowly than had been anticipated. Fausett
informed Reynolds that he thought it advisable for
them to prepare in writing an agreement setting forth
the rental to be charged on the items of equipment
being furnished by each of the partners and that the
same be signed by plaintiff and Reynolds. Accordingly.
their agreements were reduced to writing. (Exh'1b•'1h
4P and 5P) Disputes between Reynolds and the plam·
tiff continued to cause problems. (Rl54, 158)
Plaintiff's vice president went to the project and
· f the
informed Reynolds that his company was qmt mg
project and that Reynolds could keep any profit that
8

might be derived. In any event, the plaintiff was not
going to have anything more to do with the performance
of the contract. (R162, 195-196) Reynolds informed
him that the plaintiff should not withdraw its support
while the contract was being performed and that it
was absolutely impossible for him to complete the project without some of the equipment and men that had
been furnished by the plaintiff. (Rl62) Plaintiff then
agreed to leave some of its equipment and men on the
project as was necessary for its completion, but claimed
that Reynolds was to pay plaintiff on a rental basis
for the use of the employees and equipment. Thereafter
plaintiff walked off the project leaving its completion
in the hands of Reynolds. Rey.polds objected to this
action of the plaintiff, but remained on the project in
an effort to complete the same. (R162, 364-366)
Plaintiff continued to show on its books the equipment on the project as well as the employees it was
furnishing as part of the Koosharem Irrigation Project,
joint venture, and did not bill the expenses directly
to Reynolds. (R197, 210, Exhibits 7P-11P)
It should be noted that Reynolds has not paid

himself any rental for his equipment nor has he received
any wages or other compensation. (R367) A considerable sum of money has been paid to the plaintiff by
Reynolds for its equipment in accordance with the terms
of their written agreement. (Exhibit 5P, R367)
There remains a sum approximating $39,000 due
from the irrigation company on the project. (R322)
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Certain problems with the construction of th
e cana~
must be corrected before the final payment
·
.
.
can h
received. After havmg demanded full rental a ·
P Yinen!
.
.
f rom R eyno Id s, t h is
action was brought Pl · ..
•
.
.
· amtitt
clarms to be a supplier of materials on the job and therefore makes claim under the bonds.
. The insurance company did not discover that plain.
tiff and Reynolds were partners until after the bond~
were executed and issued. ( R339, 342-343) At no time
did the plaintiff notify the bonding company that it was
terminating or attempting to terminate its partnership
with Reynolds nor was the bonding company told thal
plaintiff was leaving the project. (Rl98, 203-204)
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL
POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT INSURANCE cm1. I
PANY'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, AS A
MATTER OF LAW.

1

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RULE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
PLAINTIFF REMAINED A PARTNER
'VITH DEFENDANT FRED REYNOL~S
FOR THE PURPOSE OF WINDING lP
PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.

10

I

I

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RULF1, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
PLAINTIFF 'VAS LIABLE TO THE INSURANCE COlVIP ANY BY INDEMNITY UNTIL
THE COMPLETION OF PARTNERSHIP
BUSINESS.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
SUBMIT TO THE JURY ANY OF DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS, ON
THEIR THEORY OF THE CASE.
'
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES T\VO AND THREE OF THE
SPECIAL VERDICT TO BE INCONSISTENT.
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
11

RULE, AS A :MATTER OF LA'V
PLAINTIFF IS ONLY ENTITLED' T~lIA:
ACCOUNTING FROl\I DEFENDANT FR~~
REYNOLDS IN \VINDING UP PARTNE
SHIP BUSINESS.
R.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT INSURANCE cm1.
P ~Y'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
The evidence adduced by the plaintiff shows as
a matter of law that the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover against the insurance company on its bonds.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the vice-president
of the plaintiff corporation, Max Fausett, knew that
Reynolds was obtaining a bond on behalf of the joint
venture. (R174-176, 178-180). The plaintiff also well
knew that because of its financial position a bond woula
not be issued to the plaintiff. (R176, 342-343).

I

I

I
:

I

i

'.

Plaintiff requested that Reynolds obtain the bonas ·
in his name thereby concealing from the insurance '
company that the plaintiff was a partner in the ~r·
formance of the contract. (RI 74-176). At no tune
has the plaintiff denied being a partner with Reynolas '
in the performance of the contract. (R24-27, 46·50• '
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143-144, 182-183). Plaintiff also admits that after the

bonds were issued, the project was commenced and the
work was being performed jointly by the plaintiff and
Reynolds, as partners, up to the time the plaintiff
attempted to withdraw from the partnership. (Rl37I38, 141-148, 152-155, 158, 162). Plaintiff also admits
that at no time was the insurance company notified
that it was attempting to withdraw from the partnership. (Rl98, 203-204).
The obligation of partners to fulfill partnership
agreements and wind up partnership business remains
after a termination of the partnership. (Title 48-1-27,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953; Ferrin v. Ferrin, 7
Ut2d 5, 315 P2d 978). The partners may not, by
their own actions, relieve themselves from partnership
liability to a third person without that person's consent. (40 Am J ur, Partnerships, Section 273; Title
48-1-32, U.C.A. 1953).
The facts in the instant case show without dispute
that plaintiff and Reynolds entered into a joint venture
or partnership agreement for the performance of the
contract to build the irrigation canal. Their respective
rights and duties as joint venturers or partners are
governed according to the law of partnerships. (Lane
v. Peterson, 68 Utah 858, 251 P. 274; Bates v. Simpson, 121 "Utah 165, 239 P2d 749; Cook v. Peter Kiewit
Sons Company, 15 Ut2d 20, 386 P2d 616.)

A silent partner is bound by the authorized acts
of his partner on partnership business in accordance
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with the principles of agency. (30 Am Jur, Joint Ad
ventures, Section 55, pages 980--982; 40 Arn J
Partnerships, Section 188, page 259; Title _ ~'
Utah Code Annotated, 1953).

48 1

The plaintiff is therefore bound to indemnif. ti
J le
msurance company for any loss it may sustain as the
result of its issuing bonds on the partnership pro· t
Jee.
( 40 Am J ur, Partnerships, Section 136, page 2
24
Bates v. Simpson, supra; Titles 48-1-6, 48-1-12, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953).
•

It is conceded by the plaintiff that the awarding
of the contract in question by the irrigation company
would not have been possible without proper bonding.
( R 17 5-17 6) . A partner cannot accept the benefits of
a contract entered into by his partner in the perform·
ance of the partnership business, and with his ap·
proval, without sharing in the obligations and duties
imposed upon the partnership by the contract. (Title
48-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).

The performance of partnership obligations IB
chargeable to all of the partners. The plaintiff could
not terminate the partnership obligation it had to the
insurance company until the partnership had been dis·
solved and its affairs wound up. (Ferrin v. Ferrin,
supra, Titles 48-1-27, 48-1-28, and 48-1-30, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953).
It is therefore respectfully submitted by the de·
fendant insurance company that its bonds, and t~
obligations therein, issued in the name of Fred Rey-
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L

nolds, in the performance of the canal project, were
in fact a benefit to and an obligation of the partnership. The partnership subsequently entered into performance of the contract with its anticipated profits.
The plaintiff, as a partner of Reynolds, accepted all
obligations of the partnership agreement which included the obligation of indemnity to the insurance
company in the event the partnership project was not
completed in a successful manner. (Exhibit 33 D,
Title 48-1-6 and 12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 27
Am Jur, Indemnity, Section 16, Page 345).
The Court therefore erred in failing to rule as a
matter of law that the plaintiff could not secure a bond
on the partnership project, it being a partner, and
thereafter claim as an independent third party for
labor and materials supplied in the performance of its
own contract.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RULE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
PLAINTIFF REMAINED A
PARTNER
WITH DEFENDANT FRED REYNOLDS
FOR THE PURPOSE OF WINDING UP
PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.
The evidence clearly shows that the attempt by
plaintiff to terminate the partnership with Reynolds
was ineffectual as to the insurance company in the per-

15

formance of the contract in question. Pla' t'ff' .
.
.•
m I s "H'e
president testified that the company was f II
·
u Yawart
f
h
o t e fact that there was a bond on the
·
project ana
that the terms of the contract must be comp}' d .
.
.
re ~
In spite of this knowledge plaintiff attempted to waP.
off the job when it appeared that the probability 0'.
profit was rapidly diminishing. Reynolds did not ·con:
sent to tl~e plaintiff's request for termination of !ht
partnership. (Rl62, 364-366). Plaintiff admits thar
Reynolds protested the plaintiff's leaving the job ana
that he admonished the paintiff that the job was bonded
and must be completed. (Rl62, 364-366).
A partnership is not terminated on dissolution, but
continues until the winding up of partnership affairs
is completed. (Title 48-1-27, U.C.A. 1953; Ferrin
v. Ferrin, supra). The plaintiff could not, by walking '
off the project, escape responsibility to the insurance !
company, defendant Reynolds, and to the irrigation
company for the performance of the partnership con·
1
tract. (Title 48-1-15, U.C.A. 1953).
I

I

The evidence clearly shows that plaintiff did not!
reach a mutual understanding with defendant Rey· r
nolds concerning the termination of the partn~rship I
(Rl62, 364-366). Plaintiff told Reynolds that it Wai
quitting the project but it would leave its men ano
equipment on the project as needed by Reynolds to ·
complete the contract. Plaintiff remained a partner
until completion of the contract, and the tria· l court ''
should have so ruled. (Ferrin v. Ferrin, supra).
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RGLE, AS A 1\tlATT'ER OF LAW, THAT
PLAINTIFF 'VAS LIABLE TO THE INSURANCE CO.MP ANY BY INDEMNITY UNTIL
THE CO.MPLETION OF PARTNERSHIP
B~SINESS.

The plaintiff not only ratified the acts of defendant
Reynolds in obtaining the bond on the project for the
benefit of the partnership, but induced him to do so
because of the inability of plaintiff to obtain the necessary bonds in its own behalf. (R174-176, 178-180, 342343). Plaintiff could not escape its obligation to indenmif y the bonding company for any loss suffered
on the project by attempting to terminate its partnership with Reynolds. (Title 48-1-15, 30, 31, 33 U.C.A.
1953). No notice was ever given to the insurance company that plaintiff was abandoning the project. (R198,
203-204). To permit plaintiff to withdraw from the
partnership and avoid the consequences of the bond
and the indemnity flowing therefrom would be a gross
fraud upon both Reynolds and the insurance company. (23 Am Jur, Fraud & Deceit, Sections 79 and
93). The plaintiff actively concealed from the bonding
company that it was a partner on the project when the
bonds were obtained, knowing full well that it had
no bonding capacity, or standing, with the insurance
company and that the bond application would have
been rejected had the msurance company known of

17

the plaintiff's position as a partner. (R 343 )
. 'ff
. TD
P 1amti purposely requested that Reynolds obt.
bonds by withholding the fact that plaintiff ~~ th
partner. (RI 78-179). This constitutes a clear f' rau
o~ the bo.nding company. (23 Am Jur, Fraud &D;
ce1t, . Section~ 79, 9~ and 94) . The plaintiff should~
reqmred to mdemmfv
• the bonding compan,·
• for am
loss suffered and should not be permitted to claim pa;
ment under its own bond.
·

1

POINT IV

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
SUBl\ilIT TO THE JURY ANY OF DEFEND·
ANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS, OX
THEIR THEORY OF THE CASE.

At the conclusion of the evidence the defendant
submitted their requested jury instructions to t~
Court. (R75-91). The Court rejected each and ere~
request thereby effectively keeping from the jury t~
defendants' theory of the case. Exception to the Courf1
failure to instruct was taken by the defendants. (R~2~
421). The instructions given by the Court to the jur:
failed to inform the jury of the rights and duties ol
partners to each other in the performance of partner·
ship obligations. The Court also failed to instruct t~
jury as to the rights and duties of the partners m
1
regard to the insurance company. There was alsobli
.
h ·
ntheo
failure by the Court to mstruct t e Jury 0
1
•

18

gations of the partners in winding up the partnership
business. ( R58-68) .

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES.
The Court failed to submit the issue of damages
to the jury over the objection of defendants. (R5868, R421). The plaintiff's claim for damages should
have been decided by the jury. (Holland v. Wilson,
8 Ut2d 11, 327 P2d 250). The Court erred in its failure to instruct the jury on damages and left this issue
totally unresolved by the jury. In fact, the Trial Court
substituted its mvn opinion for that of the jury as to
the damages.
Plaintiff claimed that Reynolds was negligent in
performing the contract and that it was entitled to
damages because of such negligence. The jury found
that plaintiff and Reynolds were jointly negligent in
the commencement of the project, but that after the
plaintiff abandoned the project, Reynolds continued
on with the work without negligence and performed
the remaining work in a workmanlike manner. This
finding by the jury would eliminate any further claims
by plaintiff for damages flowing therefrom, as a result
of any alleged negligence by Reynolds. (R54 57).

19

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING ri
},IND THE JURY'S ANS\VERS TO lNTEt.

ROGATORIES T\VO AND THREE OF THR
SPECIAL VERDICT TO BE INCONSISTEX~

The jury's answers made to interrigatories Xt
2 and 3 clearly show that their findings were incori·
sistent. ( R54-57). In answer No. 2, the jurors foun,1
that the plaintiff and defendant Reynolds modifi~
their original partnership agreement in that the plain- .
tiff agreed to permit its equipment to remain on tnt:
job until completion thereof, but instead of sharini,
in the profits, plaintiff was to receive only rentals. In
answer to question No. 3, the jurors found that tile:
plaintiff and Reynolds did not terminate their original I
agreement of partnership and that Reynolds did no1 !
agree to take over the job and rent plaintiff's equi~·,
ment. (R54-57).
I
1

It is respectfully submitted that the answers to tile
interrogatories are clearly contradictory and should~
totally disregarded. ( 53 Am J ur, Trial, Page iJ.i. '.·
Section 1082). The remaining questions submitted.:• j

I

the jury were answered to th.e eff e~t that both part~:
to the partnership were negligent m the performa ·
to the contract when work was first commenced. Tni '
jurv further found that after the plaintiff withdre~'
•
· d
'ththeWO~i
from the project Reynolds contmue on w1
.:
m a workmanlike manner without any further n~gl1· I
. par t . (R54-57). By the jury'sfindID~· 1
gence on h is

20

1

anv loss that occurred as a result of negligent work
sh~uld be rightly chargeable to both partners.
It is respectfully brought to the Court's attention

that at no time did either the plaintiff or Reynolds
claim a modification of the partnership agreement reducing the plaintiff's participation to mere rentals. It
has at all times been claimed by the plaintiff that the
partnership had been terminated and that thereafter
plaintiff was not a partner on the project. (R46-50,
162).

The Court committed error by instructing the
Jury that there was a dispute as to whether or not the
partnership had been completely terminated or merely
modified as to its terms. ( R54-57) . The record will
clearly show that Reynolds at all times maintained
that the plaintiff was still a partner on the project
according to the original agreement. (RI62, 364-366}.
The jury's answers to interrogatories No. 2 and 3
were inconsistent and should have been disregarded
by the Court.

POINT VII

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RULE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
PLAINTIFF IS ONLY ENTITLED TO AN
ACCOUNTING FROl\1 DEFENDANT FRED
REYNOLDS IN 'VINDING UP PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.

21

I

I

The Court erred in not ruling as a matter 0f, ;
131
that the plaintiff is only entitled to an account' f '
lllg fOL
Reynolds. By statute, as ·well as common law
plaintiff is not entitled to dissolve the joint ve~!
or partnershi~ while a partnership contract is int~
process of bemg performed, thereby leaving Remo!~
to the task of completing the contract at his 0~~ r~l
By previous pronouncement of this Court, as well~
by statute, the plaintiff remains a partner for tl/
purpose of performing the contract and winding uu:
partnership affairs. (Ferrin v Ferrin, supra; Titi~!
48-1-27, U.C.A. 1953). Reynolds has receiveh:
money for the rental of his equipment and has bee~'
required to advance approximately $22,000.00 of k'
personal funds to pay bills incurred by the joint ven·
ture. ( R37 4) . In no event would the plaintiff be en·
titled to make a claim against the insurance compan~
on the bonds issued for the performance of the partner· I
ship contract.
It is conceded by the plaintiff that if the partner·
ship had not been terminated by the actions of th
plaintiff in walking off the job, no obligation w&
owing to the plaintiff from the insurance company.n~
virtue of its bonds. Plaintiff's requested instruction
No. 3 clearly reflects this position. (R72) ·
CONCLUSION
It is admitted without dispute that a joint .v~;
·
d · t between pJaunw
ture or partnership was entere m o
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and Reynolds in bidding and performing the contract
in question. It is also admitted by the plaintiff that
because of its lack of bonding capacity, it induced
Revnolds to obtain bonds fromthe insurance company
in his name as principal and to deliberately withhold
the fact that plaintiff was a partner. Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, it
shows as a matter of law that the plaintiff has no cause
of action against the insurance company and is only
entitled to an accounting from its partner, Fred Reynolds.
The trial court misapplied the law in the instant
case, as is clearly evidenced by its memorandum decision on file herein. (R102-103). The Court in substance said that it was clear from the evidence that
there was no termination or dissolution of the partnership, and only a modification of the agreement between
the partners whereby the plaintiff was not to share in
any profit on the project, but merely to receive a rental
for its equipment. (R102-103). The very nature of a
partnership or joint venture requires that the partners
share in profits and losses. Without this necessary
element there can be no partnership or joint venture.
(Title 48-1-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
It is respectfully submitted as follows:
1. That the judgment as to both defendants should

! be reversed and vacated.

·1

11

I

2. That the lower court be instructed to dismiss
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the action as to the defendant, General Insuranc r
e -011)
pany of America.
3. That plaintiff and defendant Reynolds be fl.

quired to make an accounting, one to the other, as part.
ners on said joint venture.

4. That the lower court be instructed to aw~ .

all costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in favor of~
fendant, General Insurance Company of Americaw
against plaintiff, Eastern Utah Development C0rrt
pany.
Respectfuly submitted,

'V

F. Robert Bayle and
allace R. Lauchnor of
BAYLE, HURD & LAUCHNOR
ll05 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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